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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE ACTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE - STATUS OF LESSEE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY - Defendant Wilmington
Parking Authority was a tax-exempt state agency organized under the Delaware Parking Authority Act1 to build and operate a public off-street parking facility. Financing of the project was accomplished primarily by the
issuance of self-liquidating bonds, but fifteen percent of the necessary
capital was advanced by the City of Wilmington from its public funds. The
state agency had statutory authority to lease space in the facility for private
commercial uses, but only to the extent that the rentals thereby obtained
were needed to meet the state requirement that the facility be self-supporting.2 In accordance with this authority space was leased to defendant lessee,
a restaurant, which installed most of the restaurant furnishings at its own
expense. Lessee covenanted to occupy and use the premises in accordance
with all applicable laws, but no control over operation of the restaurant was
reserved by the state agency. Lessee refused to serve plaintiff, a Negro, be-

1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 501 {1953).
2 DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 501, 504 (a) (1953); Wilmington Parking Authority v.
R.anken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 461, 105 A.2d 614, 626 (1954).
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cause of his race. Plaintiff joined lessee and the Parking Authority in a
proceeding to enjoin lessee's3 alleged discriminatory conduct. A state
chancery court held that lessee's conduct was prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,4 finding "state action" in the
fact of state ownership of the leased property and the importance of the
rental income to the continued existence of the parking facility.I'.• On appeal,
held, reversed. Since the Parking Authority did not locate the restaurant
inside the public structure for the convenience of users of the parking
facility, and did not directly or indirectly operate the restaurant or financially enable it to operate, lessee was acting in a purely private capacity and
thus was not restrained by the fourteenth amendment. Wilmington Parking
Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), jurisdictional question postponed, 364 U.S. 810 (1960).
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 6 Soon after
the amendment was adopted the United States Supreme Court held that it
was not a limitation upon private action.7 Although our courts still talk in
terms of "state" and "private" action, judicial decision has been bringing
within the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment an increasing· number of acts involving private participation.8 This expansion of the state
B Lessee claimed protection under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1501 (1953): "No keeper
of an inn, tavern, hotel, or restaurant ••. shall be obliged, by law, to furnish entertainment or refreshment to persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be
offensive to the major part of his customers, and would injure his business."
4 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I.
II Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 150 A.2d 197 (Del. Ch. 1959).
6 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
s E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l (1948), where racially restrictive covenants were
held to be unenforceable, although Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), had implied
the validity of enforcing such covenants, presumably because they were private agreements; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), where a
private trust fund could not constitutionally be administered in accordance with the
settlor's racially-restrictive directions so long as a state agency administered the trust;
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where a Jehovah's Witness was held to have a
legal right to distribute religious literature on the streets of a town owned by a private
company. In Ming v. Horgan, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958), the alleged
deprivation of right by realtors and house builders was brought within the fifth and
fourteenth amendments on the basis of state licensing of defendants, federal mortgage
guarantees, building inspection and advertising. But other courts have found no state
action under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, 131 F. Supp. ll4
(E.D. Pa. 1955). See generally Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); State Action: A Study of the
Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment, l RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956); Comment, 61 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1948). See also Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State
Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957), where the
·writer suggests it would be better to focus on "denial of equal protection" rather than on
"state action." The same e.xpansive trend appears with respect to state action under the
fifteenth amendment. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey
v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), which had upheld the Texas Democratic Party's White
Primary rule on the ground that the state was not sufficiently involved in the exclusion
since the rule had been adopted at a Party convention and without express state sanction.

452

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

action concept is largely due to the anti-discrimination attitude which has
dominated American constitutional jurisprudence during the past two
decades, and increased government participation in areas of activity previously thought of as confined to private proprietorship.9 Although "state
action" is not susceptible of precise definition at present, it does not appear
that its growth-potential has been eliminated.10 The principal case was
concerned with whether racially-discriminatory conduct of a lessee of stateowned property is state action.11 In an early state court decision which
seems to have been based on the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, racial discrimination by a short-term lessee of a municipal auditorium was not constitutionally prohibited so long as non-white groups had an equal opportunity to obtain such leases.1 2 However, in several subsequent state and
federal decisions the lessee's discriminatory conduct has been held to be
within the scope of the state action concept.13 At least one writer has asserted the general proposition that no lessee of state-owned property may
racially discriminate.14 This proposition, on examination of the cases,
appears to be an over-generalization, for in each case one or more additional factors were present which indicated a state "connection" with
lessee's discriminatory conduct beyond mere state property-ownership.
Thus in some of the cases it appeared that the lease was made to accomplish
indirectly the discrimination which would have been unconstitutional if
done by the state directly; 15 under such circumstances it appears that the
9 GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 47-48 (1959). In Kauper, Trends in
Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 179 (1959), the writer points out that antidiscrimination pressures also have led to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
which, as subsequently interpreted, completely rejects the "separate-but-equal" doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and makes it unlawful for a state to classify
racially for the enjoyment of legal rights and privileges.
10 GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 50. But in Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182
(1960), involving discrimination by a restaurant lessee, the Court avoided the state action
problem by holding that a bus terminal restaurant that operates as an "integral part"
of a bus line's interstate passenger service is barred by the Interstate Commerce Act from
segregating interstate bus passengers.
11 See generally Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 647 (1956).
12 Harris v. City of St. Louis, 233 Mo. App. 911, 11 I S.W.2d 995 (1938).
13 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924
(1957); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Jones v. Marva Theatres,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960); Simkins v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562
(M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Lawrence v. Hancock,
76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83
N.E.2d 82 (1948); Kern v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940). In Muir
v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and remanding per
curiam 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), the vacated judgment had upheld the racial discrimination of a short-term lessee of an amphitheatre in a public park. But the basis for the
decision is not clear, and the case is of little help in analyzing the problem.
14 GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 53, 112. Language found in some of the cases
seems to lend support to the proposition. See, e.g., La,\Tence v. Hancock, supra note 13,
at 1009: "It is not conceivable that a city can provide the ways and means for a private
individual or corporation to discriminate against its own citizens.''
16 E.g., Simkins v. City of Greensboro, supra note 13; Lawrence v. Hancock, supra
note 13; Culver v. City of Warren, supra note 13.
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act of leasing would itself be unconstitutional state action.16 In other cases
there existed substantial governmental control over operation of the facility; although this factor can be construed merely as adding weight to the
inference that the lease was made in order to achieve a discriminatory purpose,17 it appears to be a factor which can itself establish a basis for state
action.18 Also, in some cases the leased facility was constructed and maintained with public funds; but only once has this factor occurred apart from
the "indirect discrimination" and "state control" factors, and then it did
not appear to be the basis on which state action was found.19 In all of the
cases it appeared that when the state acquired or constructed the leased
facility it intended to provide a service which would be open to all or a
substantial part of the general public. This "use by the public" appears
to be most significant, for it enables a court to regard the lessee as an "instrumentality" of the state and thus to find state action despite the defenses
of a good-faith lease and lack of state control.20 The court in the principal
case, in distinguishing those cases which held lessee's conduct to be state
action, found the lease to be a bona fide arm's-length transaction, an absence
of state control over operation of the restaurant, and insubstantial public
financing. The court also found that the leased space had been acquired
by the Parking Authority to provide income to help finance the parking
facility rather than to provide parking facility users with a restaurant
service.21
Although the court in the principal case recognized its obligation to
follow federal decisions, it felt obligated to construe narrowly the cases
finding state action because their application would erode local law.22
16 Compare Tate v. Department of Conservation &: Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va.
1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956),
with Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), in which only the constitutionality of the lease was at issue.
17 See Simkins v. City of Greensboro, supra note 13.
18 See Derrington v. Plummer, supra note 13, at 924.
19 Kem v. City Comm'rs, supra note 13. See also Mitchell v. Boys' Club, 157 F. Supp.
101, 107-08 (D.D.C. 1957) (dictum), involving discriminatory conduct on privately-owned
property, where the court states that governmental control rather than financial aid is
the decisive factor. To see how the courts deal with discriminatory acts occurring on
privately-owned property, see Abernathy, supra note 8, at 386-91.
20 This factor appears to be the basis of the decision in Kerr v. City Comm'rs, supra
note 13. In Derrington v. Plummer, supra note 13, at 925-26, the court says, "[T]he express purpose of the lease was to furnish cafeteria service for the benefit of persons
having occasion to be in the County Courthouse. If the County had rendered such a
service directly, it could not be argued that discrimination on account of race would not
be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result inevitably follows when the
service is rendered through an instrumentality of a lessee; and in rendering such service
the lessee stands in the place of the County." And see Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp.
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), where the court lucidly discusses the factors of "use by the public,"
"state control,'' and "state financial aid" in relation to a restaurant concessionaire in a
public park. See also Nash v. Air Terminal Services, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949),
also involving a restaurant concessionaire.
21 Principal case at 901.
22 Principal case at 902.
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This may account for the absence of consideration by the court of a possible ramification of the "use by the public'' factor which appears to have
been suggested in Derrington v. Plummer,2s and which would require finding state action in the principal case. In the absence of a state purpose to
discriminate, or state control over the operation of the enterprise, the court
in Derrington states that in order for the discriminatory conduct of a
lessee of state-owned property not to be state action, the defendants must
show that the leased space was surplus property neither used nor needed
for state purposes. This suggested requirement that the leased space not
be needed for state purposes might be regarded as just another statement
of the previously-made inquiry into whether the state intended the leased
facility itself to provide a service open to the public. However, the scope of
"state purpose" need not be thus restricted. Rather, this suggested requirement in Derrington supports an analysis which would look beyond whether
the leased facility itself was intended to be open to the public, and which
would ascertain whether any specific public purpose underlay making the
lease, in what manner the lease was to serve this specific public purpose,
and whether or not the lease still served that purpose. Thus, in the principal case the purpose of the lease was specifically to provide income to
aid in financing the parking facility, and neither the need for the parking
service nor the need for the rents to finance the facility had terminated.
So long as this rents paid-public service relationship exists, the state will be a
party to any racial discrimination practiced by the lessee in his capacity as
occupant of the leased premises.24 Although the lessee would not be an
"instrumentality" of the state in the sense that by operating the facility it
is standing in the place of the state, it is reasonable to advance this extension of the "instrumentality" rationale in light of the increased proprietary
activities in which one finds government participation. This increase,
combined with contemporary anti-discrimination pressures, seems to warrant a further expansion of the state action concept.
Stephen Bard

23 supra note
24 See Morse,

18, at 924-25.
Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, Z1 FORDHAM
L. REv. 187, 192-96 (1958), where the writer suggests that activities "affecting and effecting"
a public purpose, when considered in the light of the expanding connotative meaning of
"public purpose," could be analogized as the performance of a governmental function.
Thus, when lessee performs the function of providing income to meet the facility's operating expenses, it is an "agent" of the state. For the development of the "public purpose"
concept in the area of eminent domain powers, see Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use
in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940).

